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Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 was designed
as a prophylactic measure to curb insiders'2 abuse of nonpublic infor-
mation.3 Courts have interpreted section 16(b) to effectuate its pur-
pose-the prevention of short-term speculation based on inside
information.4 Because motive, that is, the intent to capitalize on inside
information, or the actual use of such information is difficult to prove,
the section requires disgorgement of all "profits ' 5 earned on purchases
* A.B. 1972, M.B.A. 1976, J.D. 1976, Stanford University; Member of the California and
District of Columbia Bars.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). Section 78p provides in part:
(a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10
per centum of any class of any equity security... which is registered pursuant to section
781 of this title, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file
... a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such
changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar month.
(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer ... within any period of less than six
months,. . . shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention
on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction
of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period
exceeding six months.
2. Officers, directors, and holders of 10% of the outstanding shares of a class of the issuer's
securities are insiders. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976). For a discussion of the scope of the definition of
an officer, see Comment, Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange 4ct of 1934: Is a Vice Presi-
dent an Officer?, 58 NEs. L. REv. 733 (1979).
3. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 234 (1976); Kern County
Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 592-93 n.23 (1973); Reliance Elec. Co. v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972); S. & S. Realty Corp. v. Kleer-Vu Indus. Inc., 575
F.2d 1040, 1044 (2d Cir. 1978); American Standard, Inc. v. Crane, 510 F.2d 1043, 1054 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975); Lewis v. Varnes, 505 F.2d 785, 787-88 (2d Cir. 1974).
Application of the statute is limited to trading equity securities of an issuer with a class of
securities registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976).
4. See, ag., Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959).
5. "Profits" are normally calculated to maximize the amount recouped from the insider.
Thus, the highest-sale price is matched with the lowest-purchase price in a given six-month period.
Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 51-52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); Makofsky v.
Ultra Dynamics Corp., 383 F. Supp. 631, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Rather than using strict matching,
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and sales occurring within a six-month period6 regardless of motive or
actual use of inside information.7 Thus, courts have favored a literal
application of the statute so that insiders can know with some degree of
certainty the conduct prohibited by section 16(b).8
Nevertheless, judicial disagreement exists concerning the section's
applicability to certain transactions. 9 Courts have not been able to for-
some courts have used average prices. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf& W. Indus., Inc., 527
F.2d 335, 356-57 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078, cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976).
Purchases and sales of related securities may be matched if they are sufficiently related to
permit in-and-out trading between the two classes: for example, between common and converti-
ble preferred. See 2 L. Loss, SEcuRnuTs REGULATION 1059 (2d ed. 1961); Hamilton, Convertible
Securities and Section 16(b): The End of an Era, 44 Tax. L. REv. 1447, 1489 (1966); Rubin &
Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L.
Rv. 468, 486 (1947). However, unrelated classes of securities will not be matched. See Smolowe
v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 237 n.13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); Hamilton,
supra, at 1489.
6. Section 16(b) specifies a period of "less than six months." This period begins on the date
of the initial transaction. It extends to the second day prior to the date in the sixth month that
corresponds numerically to the date of the initial transaction. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors
Corp., 132 F. Supp. 100, 103-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), remanded on other grounds, 232 F.2d 299 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
7. See, ag, Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972); Heli-Coil
Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 165 (3d Cir. 1965). Conversely, insiders may trade on the basis of
inside information with impunity from section 16(b) liability if they do not purchase and sell
within the six-month period. See Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
827 (1954).
Section 16(b) does not reach all trading on the basis of inside information, 404 U.S. at 422;
Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 411-12 (1962); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959),
and courts may not expand application of section 16(b) beyond its admittedly narrow bounds-
expansion is the prerogative of Congress. 368 U.S. at 412-13. Courts have found it within their
power, however, to narrow the scope of section 16(b) when literal application of the statute is not
required to further its purpose. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232,
244,251-52,255 (1976); Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 594-
95 (1973); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 536 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
See generaly Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 516 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
Courts have been eager to give broad effect to section 16(b) to prevent fraud by insiders;
however, with the vast expansion of proscribed behavior under rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1981), no purpose is served by an expansive interpretation of section 16(b). See Hazen, The New
Pragmatism Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 54 N.C.L. REv. 1, 2-4
(1975); Lowenfels, Section 16(b): .4 Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 CORNELL L. Rv. 45,
61-64 (1968); Note, Reliance Electric andl6(b) Litigation: .4 Return to the Objective Approach?, 58
VA. L. REv. 907, 914-15 (1972).
8. See, eg., Lewis v. Varnes, 505 F.2d 785, 789 (2d Cir. 1974).
9. See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 593 (1973);
Morales v. Mapeo, Inc., 541 F.2d 233, 235 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
Compare Matas v. Siess, 467 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (insider's exercise of stock appreciation
rights under an option plan is both a purchase and a sale) with Rosen v. Drisler, 421 F. Supp. 1282
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (repurchase of insider's options by issuer is neither a purchase nor a sale) and
compare Booth v. Varian Assocs., 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965) (no
purchase until insider knows amount and price of stock) with Prager v. Sylvestri, 449 F. Supp. 425
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (purchase occurs when insider becomes irrevocably committed to transaction).
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mulate a single set of criteria for characterizing purchases and sales
applicable to all transactions.' 0 Currently, the determination whether a
transaction is a purchase or sale may depend not only on its character-
istics, but also on the purchaser's actual knowledge" 1 or a court's deci-
sion that a transaction is ordinary or unorthodox.' 2 The usual
explanation for the dissimilar treatment of transactions is that courts
must apply the statute mechanically or "objectively" to ordinary trans-
actions to effectuate its purpose, but must apply the statute flexibly or
"pragmatically" to unorthodox transactions to accomplish the same
goal.' 3 This dichotomy has made it difficult for insiders to determine
what transactions will be considered purchases or sales, and numerous
insiders have been held liable for transactions that they could not have
known were covered by the statute.14 This uncertainty should not exist
in section 16(b) analysis. The analysis used to characterize transactions
as purchases or sales should be the same for all transactions. ' Indeed,
scrutiny of the objective and pragmatic approaches reveals that they
A number of commentators have analyzed particular types of transactions to determine
whether and when purchases or sales take place for section 16(b) purposes. See, e.g., Husband &
Powers, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange 4ct of 1934 and Insider Trading Involving Issuer-
Granted Employee Stock Options, 57 DEN. L.J. 71, 94-95 (1979); Tomlinson, The Application of
Section 16(b) to QualiffedEmployee Benefit Plans, 33 STAN. L. REv. 231 (1981); Note, Put and Call
Options Under Section 16 ofthe Securities Exchange Act, 69 YALE L.L 868, 876-77 (1960).
10. See Portnoy v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1188, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Hazen,
supra note 7, at 3. The terms "purchase" and "sell" are defined broadly in the 1934 Act: "The
terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire. The
terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78c(a)(13)-(14) (1976). For purposes of section 16(b), purchases and sales are not defined solely
in terms of normal commercial principles. Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 697 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971); Lewis v. Dwyer, 365 F. Supp. 607, 608-09 (D. Mass. 1973).
The terms purchase and sale are used to indicate the inception and termination of an investment.
See Hell-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 172 (3d Cir. 1965) (Hastie, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part); Morales v. Gould Investors Trust, 445 F. Supp. 1144, 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
11. Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340, 344 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
12. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf& W. Indus., Inc., 527 F.2d 335, 351 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1078, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 928 (1976); Mouldings, Inc. v. Potter, 465 F.2d 1 I01,
1104 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973); Morales v. Gould Investors Trust, 445 F.
Supp. 1144, 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Lewis v. Arcara, 401 F. Supp. 449, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
13. See Lewis v. Varnes, 505 F.2d 785, 789 (2d Cir. 1974) (courts are free to adopt the prag-
matic approach to section 16(b) only if section 16(b) is intrinsically ambiguous or if alternate
plausible applications are available in a particular factual situation).
14. See, eg., Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340, 343 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873
(1974) (each unorthodox transaction must be examined individually to determine the applicability
of the statute); Matas v. Siess, 467 F. Supp. 217, 220-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Hazen supra note 7, at 2;
McElroy, Pragmatic Disgorging of Insider Profts: A Review of Cases Reported Under Section
16(b), 7 ST. MARY's L.J. 473, 480 (1975); Note, supra note 7, at 911-12.
15. The Supreme Court has already questioned the distinction between the objective and the
subjective analysis, Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 594 n.25
(1973), but thus far the lower courts have continued to apply this distinction. See notes 38-40 infra
and accompanying text.
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share a common set of principles which can be used to determine
whether a transaction is a purchase or sale. Proper application of these
principles eliminates the threshold question of whether a transaction is
unorthodox.
This article constructs a single analytical model from the objective
and the pragmatic approaches to section 16(b). The discussion begins
with an overview of both approaches, followed by a demonstration that
both the objective and the pragmatic analyses are based for the most
part on principles that form a single set of criteria applicable to any
transaction.
I. THE OBJECTIVE AND PRAGMATIC ANALYSES
A. The Objective Analysis
The earliest judicial interpretations of section 16(b) adopted an ob-
jective analysis.16 Under the objective analysis any transfer of benefi-
cial ownership for value is a purchase and sale.17 The analysis permits
no inquiry into an insider's motive or his access to, or use of, inside
information.18 Access to inside information is conclusively presumed
because of the insider's relationship to the issuer.19 This approach re-
quires only a factual inquiry: has a transfer for value occurred?20 This
simple approach does not, however, resolve the difficult issue of deter-
mining when the purchase or sale takes place. Courts have developed
two methods to determine when the purchase or sale occurs.
16. See, ag., Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943).
17. See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 594 (1973);
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 527 F.2d 335, 351 (7th Cir. 1975), cer. denied,
423 U.S. 1078, cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976); Lewis v. Vames, 505 F.2d 785, 789 (2d Cir. 1974);
Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F. Supp. 881, 884-85 nn.13-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). For a critique of the
objective approach, see Note, supra note 7.
The transfer must be for value, because gifts, transfers by will, and similar transactions are
not purchases or sales. Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 337 U.S. 907
(1949); see Rubin & Feldman, supra note 5, at 485. Also, transactions where no consideration is
paid, e.g., stock splits and pro rata warrant distributions, are not insider purchases. 172 F.2d at
142; Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387, 390-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
18. Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 165 (3d Cir. 1965); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.,
136 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. W.R.
Stephens Inv. Co., 141 F. Supp. 841, 845 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
19. Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 521-22 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W.
3375 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1981) (No. 80-1403); American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 510 F.2d 1043,
1053 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975); Booth v. Varian Assocs., 334 F.2d 1, 3 (Ist
Cir. 1964); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943); Fistel v. Christman, 133 F. Supp. 300, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See Stella v. Graham-Paige
Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299, 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
20. Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967). See
Lowenfels, supra note 7, at 47.
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1. Irrevocable commitment. In the mid-1950s, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held that a purchase occurs when the pur-
chaser is irrevocably committed to take and pay for the stock.21 The
court reasoned that the transfer of beneficial ownership, not the actual
transfer of title, is the decisive consideration.22 The court recognized
that the purpose of section 16(b) is to prevent insider speculation by
requiring disgorgement of profits. 23 Because an insider can profit from
speculation as soon as he is assured of a fixed quantity of stock at a
fixed price, the court reasoned that a purchase occurs at the moment
the insider is obligated to purchase the stock.24 Once an insider is obli-
gated to take and pay for the stock, he acquires the ability to profit,
even if title is not transferred until a later time and the consideration is
not yet paid or even calculated.25 Under similar reasoning, a sale
21. Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954). Blau is the leading case for determin-
ing the date of purchase of a security. Ogsbury held a stock option which provided that once he
notified the corporation of his election to purchase the stock, he would be irrevocably bound to
purchase the stock, although title and stockholder rights would not be transferred until payment.
Ogsbury delivered an election to purchase in December 1945, but postponed payment until De-
cember 1948. In July 1948, within six months of payment for the stock, Ogsbury sold some shares
of the stock. Blau contended that the December 1948 payment of the purchase price constituted
the date of purchase. The court held that "the 'purchase' was consummated in 1945 when Ogs-
bury mailed his notice of election and thereby incurred an irrevocable liability to take and pay for
the stock." Id Many courts have followed the Blau v. Ogsbury irrevocable-commitment analysis.
See, e.g., Portnoy v. Revlon, Inc., 650 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 1981); Lewis v. Musham, [Current]
FED. SEc. L. RP. (CCH) 97,802 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Morales v. Reading & Bates Offshore Drilling
Co., 392 F. Supp. 41, 44-45 (N.D. Okla. 1975); Lewis v. Dwyer, 365 F. Supp. 607, 609 (D. Mass.
1973).
The contract to acquire and sell the stock must be irrevocable by both parties to the transac-
tion. Hence, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that the execution of a purchase
contract contingent on the buyer's obtaining suitable financing is not a purchase because the buyer
does not incur an irrevocable liability to take and pay for the stock. Stella v. Graham-Paige
Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299, 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956). Similarly, a buyer not
having satisfied all of the conditions precedent to a purchase contract was held not to have made a
purchase until the closing under the contract. Morales v. Gulf Energy & Dev. Corp. [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,222 (D. Colo. 1977); Lewis v. Realty Equities
Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1026, 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Certainty about all terms of a contract is not,
however, required to find a purchase; the contract must only irrevocably bind the parties to trans-
fer the securities. Oliffv. Exchange Int'l Corp., 449 F. Supp. 1277, 1297 (N.D. IM. 1978).
22. Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954); see Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 523
F.2d 680, 685-86 (2d Cir. 1975); Champion Home Builders Co. v. Jeffress, 490 F.2d 611, 616 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974).
23. Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d at 427.
24. Id; see Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 525-26 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3375 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1981) (No. 80-1903).
25. See Prager v. Sylvestri, 449 F. Supp. 425, 432-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Landy v. United Fruit
Co., 305 F. Supp. 254, 257 (D.N.J. 1969). But see Booth v. Varian Assocs., 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965). Expanding on Blau v. Ogsbury, the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit held in Booth that notwithstanding the irrevocable nature of a purchase contract,
the risks attendant to ownership must pass to the purchaser or execution of the contract will not
constitute a purchase. 334 F.2d at 4. In Booth a firm contract was executed requiring the ex-
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would occur when the seller is irrevocably committed to deliver the
stock to a purchaser.
2. Economic realities. Because the irrevocable commitment anal-
ysis is inadequate in some situations,26 a variant of that doctrine has
emerged. Under this modified analysis a purchase occurs when an in-
sider agrees to a substantial economic forfeiture if he does not take and
pay for the stock.27
The rationale underlying this analysis is similar to that supporting
the irrevocable commitment analysis. Barring a significant decline in
the value of the securities, the insider is, in an economic sense, obli-
gated to take and pay for the stock. A typical example of this obliga-
tion is the purchase of an option where the option price is large and is
deducted from a fixed purchase price for the stock. In reality the op-
tion price is a downpayment on the stock, and unless the purchaser
takes the stock, he suffers a large forfeit. The option is analogous to a
credit-purchase contract secured by a pledge of stock. In option con-
tract situations courts have held that the purchase occurs when the op-
tion contract is executed, because that is when a change in beneficial
ownership takes place.28 Because the economic-realities approach fo-
change of the buyer's shares for shares of Varian Associates. The contract specified that the ex-
change would take place three and one-half years after its execution and would be based on the
market price of Varian shares on the date before the closing. Hence, the purchasers did not have
an economic risk of gain or loss on the Varian stock until the day before the closing. The court
reasoned that the purchase did not occur until the buyer had assumed the risk. In Booth the risk
was assumed on the day the purchase price was fixed. Id at 5.
The district court for the Southern District of New York recently rejected the Booth analysis.
See Prager v. Sylvestri, 449 F. Supp. 425, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The district court noted that once
a transaction is irrevocable, there is no possibility of speculative abuse. Thus, although the risk of
gain or loss on the stock does not pass, if the buyer is irrevocably obligated to take the shares, a
purchase occurs at the time of execution of the contract. The court stated:
the critical moment in the initial "purchase" or "sale," for the purpose of determining
when that transaction occurred within the meaning of § 16(b), is that point at which the
investor becomes irrevocably committed to the transaction and, in addition, no longer
has control over the transaction in any way that could be turned to speculative advantage
by the investor.
Id at 432-33.
26. See, eg., Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992
(1971); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
27. See Ferraolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927
(1959). Similarly, a sale occurs when the insider would suffer a significant economic forfeiture if
he does not deliver the stock to the purchaser.
28. Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992
(1971) (forfeiture of a "binder" of 14% of the purchase price). But see Kern County Land Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 603-04 (1973) (forfeiture of an option premium of nine
percent of the purchase price was not sufficient to cause the option to be a sale). Bolstering the
argument in Bershad were the facts that the stock was delivered to an escrow agent pending com-
pletion of the transaction and a proxy to vote the stock was delivered to the purchaser.
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cuses on when the purchase or sell decision becomes effectively irre-
versible, it can be seen as a variant of the irrevocable commitment
analysis.
B. The Pragmatic Analsis
The objective approach to section 16(b), with its two modes of
analysis, is serviceable, but it can lead to harsh results.29 For example,
some courts have held that conversions of preferred stock to common
stock and exchanges of securities through a merger are purchases of the
newly received securities. 30 Some of these "purchases" forced insiders
to disgorge profits that either resulted from long-term investments or
were earned in an involuntary transaction in which inside information
could not have been used.3'
In response to these problems, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit developed the pragmatic approach to section 16(b) in the late
1950s. 32 The pragmatic approach involves a number of elements. 33
First, and most important, it applies only in certain unusual circum-
stances.3 4 If these circumstances exist, then the transaction is character-
ized as "unorthodox." Unorthodox transactions are ill-defined, but
they usually have peculiar features that either make it unfair to apply
section 16(b) or make it difficult to determine whether or when a
purchase or sale has taken place.35 Generally, transactions not involv-
29. See Mouldings, Inc. v. Potter, 465 F.2d 1101, 1104 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
929 (1973); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 535-36 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006
(1967).
30. Hell-Coil v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954); Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
31. See, eg., Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984, 988 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761
(1947) (requiring the return of profit arising from the conversion of preferred stock to common in
addition to the profit arising out of the "short-swing" appreciation of the common stock so
acquired).
32. Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
33. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit later followed the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), and eventually the Supreme Court
adopted the pragmatic approach for "unorthodox" transactions. See Kern County Land Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973). For a discussion of the evolution of the prag-
matic approach, see Hazen, supra note 7, at 20-26; Lowenfels, supra note 7, at 50-57; Note, Insider
Liability for Short-Swing Profts: The Substance and Function of the Pragmatic Approach, 72
MICH. L. REv. 592 (1974). For a general critique of the approach, see Note, Exceptions to LiabilityUnder Section 16(b: A4 Systematic Approach, 87 YALE L.. 1430 (1978).
34. See, eg., Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3375 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1981) (No. 80-1903); Lewis v. Musham, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 97,802 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Matas v. Siess, 467 F. Supp. 217, 220-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).




ing the payment of cash, for example an exchange of securities, are
considered unorthodox.36
If a transaction is unorthodox, courts employ the pragmatic ap-
proach to section 16(b). 37 Under the pragmatic approach, as under the
objective approach, section 16(b) applies only if the transaction in-
volves a transfer of beneficial ownership for value.38 But, unlike the
objective approach, under the pragmatic approach such a transfer is
not a purchase or sale if there is no possibility of speculative abuse in
the transaction.39 The possibility of speculative abuse exists if the in-
sider has access to inside information, whether or not he actually uses
that information, and he has control over both the decision to buy or
sell and the timing of the purchase or sale.40
The rationale underlying the pragmatic approach is simple. Sec-
tion 16(b) should be applied only when the purpose of the statute-the
prevention of the use of inside information in purchases or sales of se-
curities4 1 -can be furthered. An insider without access to inside infor-
mation obviously cannot use it. Further, even if the insider possesses
the information, it cannot be used when the purchase or sale is involun-
36. See id at 593-99 & nn.24 & 26. The Supreme Court listed transactions involving war-
rants, options, mergers, and corporate reorganizations as unorthodox. Id
37. See, e.g., Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3375 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1981) (No. 80-1903); Rosen v. Drisler, 421 F. Supp. 1282, 1286
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). In addition, at least two courts have eschewed the objective approach even as
applied to orthodox transactions. Oliff v. Exchange Int'l Corp., 449 F. Supp. 1277, 1290 (N.D. Ill.
1978); Makofsky v. Ultra Dynamics Corp., 383 F. Supp. 631, 637-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). One court
has applied both analyses. Morales v. Mapco, Inc., 541 F.2d 233, 235-36 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
38. Lewis v. Riklis, 446 F. Supp. 582, 586 (S.D.N.Y.) (no cases exist predicating liability on
an unconsummated transaction), af'd, 575 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1978).
39. See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 595, 600-01
(1973).
40. Id at 600; Morales v. Gould Investors Trust, 445 F. Supp. 1144, 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aft'd, 578 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1978); Makofsky v. Ultra Dynamics Corp., 383 F. Supp. 631, 639-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Alloys Unlimited, Inc. v. Gilbert, 319 F. Supp. 617, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). But V.
Tyco Laboratories, Inc. v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1, 5-8 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (control over
the timing of a sale and the possibility of speculative abuse are independent criteria for determin-
ing the applicability of section 16(b); satisfaction of either criterion is sufficient to cause liability to
attach). The insider need not be aware of the possibility of speculative abuse. Makofsky v. Ultra
Dynamics Corp., 383 F. Supp. 631, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
The limits of the "possibility of abuse" element of the pragmatic approach to section 16 are
discussed in Note, Insider Liabili for Short-Swing Profits: The Substance and Function of the
PragmaticApproach, 72 MICH. L. Rlv. 592 (1974). Briefly, the insider must have had an opportu-
nity for speculative abuse, whether or not the insider knew of this opportunity or acted because of
it, id 597 n.26, and the opportunity probably need have been present only at the time of the
transaction under scrutiny, not at both the time of purchase and of sale, id 598-601.
41. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
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tary.42 No purpose is served by imposing section 16(b) liability in ei-
ther of these instances.
II. THE COMMON UNDERPINNINGS OF THE Two ANALYSES
Presently, courts characterize a transaction as orthodox or unor-
thodox and then apply either the objective or pragmatic standard. The
orthodox/unorthodox distinction is neither necessary nor conducive to
a proper analysis of section 16(b). The theoretical underpinnings of
both the objective and pragmatic approaches are the same. The follow-
ing table summarizes the important elements of each approach.
Objective Approach Pragmatic Approach
1. Requires transfer of beneficial 1. Requires unorthodox transfer of
ownership for value, beneficial ownership.
2. Presumes access to inside infor- 2. Requires possibility of specula-
mation. tive abuse, which involves two
subelements:
3. Purchase or sale occurs when (a) access to inside information,
change in beneficial ownership and
takes place. (b) control over the timing of
the transaction.
As the table shows, the elements of the two approaches are virtu-
ally identical. Each approach is based on three common elements: a
transfer of beneficial ownership for value, access to inside information,
and an investment decision.
A. Transfer of Ben§qcial Ownershi# for Value
Leaving aside the orthodox or unorthodox nature of the transac-
tion, both approaches require a transfer of beneficial ownership for
value, the most difficult element in either analysis and the one courts
find most confusing. The pragmatic approach arose from cases in
which the insider had exchanged one class of security for another.43
Courts were dissatisfied with the harsh results that occurred when these
exchanges were held to be purchases and sales. In response, some
42. See Hell-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1965) (no section 16(b)
profit until there is a definitive act by the insider); Computer Power Int'l Corp. v. Alpern, [1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,901 -(S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1979); Lynam v. Living-
ston, 276 F. Supp. 104, 107 (D. Del. 1967).
43. See, eg., Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967);
Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959); Rothenberg
v. United Brands Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,045 (S.D.N.Y.
May 11, 1977), aj'd, 573 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1977).
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courts devised an elaborate analysis requiring inquiry into the possibil-
ity of speculative abuse in the transaction." This inquiry allowed
courts to conclude that most of these exchanges were not subject to
section 16(b) because they were not purchases or sales.45 Each court
that looked at a transaction in which preferred stock was converted to
common stock found correctly that the preferred was the economic
equivalent of the common; therefore, the insider had had beneficial
ownership of the common for as long as he had held the preferred.46
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for example, without ana-
lyzing the possibility of speculative abuse, concluded that characteriz-
ing such a conversion as a purchase was illogical.47 It was unnecessary
to examine the possibility of use of inside information because the pres-
ence or absence of a transfer for value was the dispositive factor. These
cases could therefore have been resolved under the objective analysis as
well as under the pragmatic analysis.48
B. Access to Inside Information
Section 16(b) literally applies to all insiders regardless of their in-
volvement with the issuer;49 therefore, under the objective approach,
insiders are presumed to have access to inside information and proof to
the contrary is not permitted.50 The pragmatic approach varies this
formulation: an insider can avoid liability by proving lack of access to
inside information, but not by proving failure to use it.s l
This distinction does not withstand scrutiny. The rationale of the
pragmatic approach is that, because section 16(b) is intended to prevent
the use of inside information, the section should not apply to those
who, because of lack of access, could not have used inside informa-
tion.52 This rationale would also support an exemption for insiders
who do not actually use inside information, or who are not aware of
44. See Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 516 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967);
Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 E2d 342, 345 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
45. Eg., Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 519-23 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002
(1967); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
46. E.g., Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 521-23 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002
(1967); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
47. Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965).
48. See Hayes v. Sampson, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. Rat. (CCH) 97,693
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1980); cf. Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967)
(convertible debentures were held equivalent to stock without resort to pragmatic analysis).
49. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
50. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
51. See notes 39-42 supra and accompanying text.
52. See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text.
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their access to it. 3 Proving either circumstance is difficult, and al-
lowing exemptions based on such proof would greatly dilute the cer-
tainty of the statute-a certainty the statute's language seems to
require.5 4 A better approach is to apply the statute to all insiders
whether or not they have access to inside information. An alternative,
less Draconian approach would be to apply the statute only to those
actually using inside information.
In any event, the ability to escape liability by proving lack of ac-
cess to inside information is not of practical significance. The only in-
siders likely to carry the burden of proving lack of access are
participants in unfriendly, partially successful take-over attempts or
other ten-percent shareholders at odds with an entrenched manage-
ment.55 These insiders do not have to prove lack of access to avoid
liability because they can avoid purchasing and selling within six
months unless one of the transactions is involuntary. If the transaction
is involuntary, no possibility of speculative abuse exists.56 In short, the
two section 16(b) approaches treat access to inside information under
unnecessarily different standards.5 7 The proper standard assumes ac-
cess to inside information.
C. Investment Decision
The remaining elements of the two analyses-the time of the
purchase or sale of beneficial ownership and control over the timing of
the transaction-both address the same critical issue: did the insider
make an investment decision? Even if a transfer of beneficial owner-
ship for value has occurred, both analyses require that the transfer re-
sult from the insider's investment decision before the transaction will
be found to be a purchase or sale.5 8
53. Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340, 344-50 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
54. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
55. All directors have a fiduciary duty to oversee the affairs of the corporation. Therefore,
they must have access to inside information regardless of whether they make use of such access.
Officers, as participants in the formulation of policy and management of the corporation, are
generally aware of, and have access to, inside information.
Ten-percent shareholders do not always have access to inside information. Nevertheless,
Congress included them within the class of persons likely to have access to such information.
Unless a demonstrable animosity exists between the shareholders and the corporation, it is diffi-
cult for the ten-percent holder to prove lack of access. See American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co.,
510 F.2d 1043, 1055 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975).
56. See Sprague Elec. Co. v. Mostek Corp., 488 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
57. The unified approach proposed later in this article satisfies the presently perceived need
for the application of the pragmatic approach. See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petro-
leum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 593-603 (1973). See text accompanying notes 65-79 in/a.
58. See Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965);
Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949).
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Under the objective approach the most important element in de-
termining when a change in beneficial ownership occurs is the point at
which the decision to purchase or sell becomes irrevocable. The objec-
tive approach emphasizes this consideration because inside information
is useful only in determining when to invest.59 Inside information can
be extremely useful in deciding whether to acquire the ability to profit,
but once an irrevocable decision to invest is made, the ability to use
inside information has passed.60 Because section 16(b) is designed to
discourage use of inside information for short-term trading, the section
ought to apply the moment the use of inside information is possible.
Therefore, under the objective approach, the purchase occurs when the
decision to invest is irrevocable, even if title will not pass or payment
will not be made until some future time.6'
The important assumption underlying this analysis is the occur-
rence of an investment decision-a point at which inside information is
useful. Some beneficial owners of stock never make the decision to
invest and therefore are never able to use inside information. Thus,
when courts speak of determining the time of the transfer of beneficial
ownership, they are determining the time and occurrence of an invest-
ment decision.
If no investment decision is made, courts should not find a
purchase or sale, even if a change in beneficial ownership occurs. This
analysis is in accord with the pragmatic approach.62 An important ele-
ment of an investment decision is control over the timing of the trans-
action. An investment decision by its nature requires a voluntary
acquisition of the ability to profit.63 If the transaction is involuntary,
no decision is made and no opportunity to use inside information ex-
ists.64 Thus, the objective and pragmatic approaches are entirely con-
sistent. Indeed, the terms objective and pragmatic are often merely
labels indicating the occurrence of an investment decision (objective) or
59. See Prager v. Sylvestri, 449 F. Supp. 425,432 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (section 16(b) applies only
to speculation-a desire to profit from market activity).
60. See id at 432-33, 437.
61. See Hell-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 168 (3d Cir. 1965) (conversion of preferred
stock to common involves an investment decision and is therefore a purchase of common).
62. See Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892
(1965).
63. See Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 535-37 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006
(1967); Blanu v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965).
In both Petteys and Max Factor the courts held that no sale resulted from the conversion of
preferred stock into common stock, in part because there was no change in either the amount at
risk or the nature of the risk.
64. See note 42 supra and accompanying text. See generally Portnoy v. Seligman & Latz,
Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
[Vol. 1981:941
SECTION 16(b)
its nonoccurrence (pragmatic), and the same underlying rationale ap-
plies to both approaches.
III. A SINGLE ANALYSIS
As the foregoing discussion suggests, there is no reason to distin-
guish between ordinary and unorthodox transactions. A single analysis
is applicable to all transactions. An insider's access to or use of inside
information is no longer at issue, for the proper analysis assumes both
access and use.65 Hence, the analysis of any transaction under section
16(b) can be reduced to three questions:
1. Was there a transfer of beneficial ownership for value?
2. Did the insider make an investment decision?
3. When did the insider make that decision?
If there is no transfer of beneficial ownership for value, section
16(b) is inapplicable.66 The elements of beneficial ownership are un-
certain under current law. Courts have found beneficial ownership to
include one or more of the following considerations: an irrevocable
obligation to purchase stock;67 acquisition of the ability to profit; 68 an
option to purchase coupled with the power to vote;69 and the ability to
benefit economically from stock even though control over the stock is
in another person's hands.70 The only indication of beneficial owner-
ship relevant to section 16(b) is the ability to profit from the stock.71
Other considerations, such as the right to vote and the power to dispose
of the stock, are irrelevant to a section 16(b) beneficial ownership anal-
ysis, though they are useful in determining beneficial ownership in
other contexts. Section 16(b) is concerned solely with profits from
short-swing trading in stock; unless an insider has the ability to profit
65. See notes 49-57 supra and accompanying text.
66. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
67. Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954). See note 21 supra.
68. Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992
(1971).
69. Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 356 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854
(1970).
70. Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 525-26 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W.
3375 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1981) (No. 80-1903); Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 523 F.2d 680, 688 (2d Cir.
1975).
71. Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992
(1971). See Lynam v. Livingston, 276 F. Supp. 104, 107 (D. Del. 1967) (the most important attri-
bute of an investment is its ability to create a profit). This definition of beneficial ownership does
not require the holding of the stock itself. Holding an economic equivalent, such as convertible
securities or options, permits an insider to profit by trading in the stock. Alternatively, the ability
to profit directly on someone else's holdings will suffice. For an excellent treatment of beneficial
ownership for section 16(b) purposes, see Note, Beneflcial Ownersiulp Under § 16(b) of the Secur-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 77 COLUM. L. Rav. 446 (1977).
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from trading the stock, he does not own it for purposes of section
16(b).72
The existence of an investment decision is crucial to effecting the
goal of section 16(b)--the prevention of profit from the use of inside
information.73 If there is no investment decision, there is no ability to
use inside information and therefore no opportunity to profit from its
use. An investment decision should be defined as the voluntary accept-
ance or termination of the ability to gain on a security. This concept
was implicitly present in cases developing the irrevocable obligation
and economic realities analyses of section 16(b). 74 The pragmatic ap-
proach arose solely because courts were faced with transactions in
which there was no investment decision or there was a decision merely
to continue an existing investment.7"
Finally, the timing of the investment decision is important because
Congress limited the reach of section 16(b) to short-swing profits
earned from the potential use of inside information. "Short-swing"
profit, by definition, is profit made by the investor within six months of
his purchase of the securities. 76 Thus, determining the time a purchase
or sale occurs is critical to the application of the section.
Because section 16(b) is designed to eliminate the use of inside
information, the time of the purchase or sale should coincide with the
time of the investment decision. Only at that time can a purchaser or
seller use inside information. The transfer of beneficial ownership may
follow the investment decision; in such instances the purchase or sale
occurs at the time of the investment decision and not at the time of the
transfer of beneficial ownership. On the other hand, the transfer of
beneficial ownership cannot precede the investment decision. Once a
transfer of beneficial ownership occurs, there can be no further use for
inside information and no possibility of an investment decision, be-
72. This conclusion does not mean that the power to vote and the power to dispose of the
securities are irrelevant to section 16(b) liability. These elements may be at issue when the court
determines the existence or time of a section 16(b) purchase or sale. They are not relevant, how-
ever, to a determination of whether the insider owned the securities in the first instance.
73. See Foremost-McKesson v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232,254 n.28 (1976) (the crucial
point under section 16(b) is when the insider makes the decision to invest, rather than when he
makes the technical purchase).
74. See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 600 (1973);
Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 537 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967); Ferraiolo v.
Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
An early case reaching a similar conclusion is Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949), in which the court held that a distribution of warrants pro rata to
all shareholders is not an insider purchase.
75. See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text.
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
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cause such a decision presupposes the ability to voluntarily transfer
beneficial ownership.77 If the transfer has already occurred no decision
is left to be made.78 Generally, the doctrines of irrevocable commit-
ment and economic risk developed under the objective approach are
suitable for fixing the time of the investment decision.79
IV. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED ANALYSIS
Adoption of the proposed analysis would provide greater consis-
tency in some of the more difficult transactions involving section 16(b).
This part of the article will analyze some of these transactions.80
A. Mergers
The typical merger involves the acquisition of one company by
another and the receipt of cash or stock in the surviving company by
the acquired company's shareholders in return for their shares. Two
questions generally arise under section 16(b). First, is the exchange of
the acquired company's shares for stock or cash a sale under section
16(b)? Second, is such an exchange a purchase of the surviving com-
pany's stock?
1. Transfer of ben§cial ownership. The exchange of stock in the
acquired company for cash or stock in the surviving company is a ter-
mination of the ability to gain on the acquired company's stock and is,
therefore, a transfer of beneficial ownership. Similarly, acquisition of
stock in the surviving company provides the ability to gain on these
shares and is, therefore, an acquisition of beneficial ownership.
2. Investment decision. Determining the existence of an invest-
ment decision is the most difficult facet of a section 16(b) analysis of a
merger. The merger itself forces all shareholders to exchange their
shares, so in one sense the transfer of beneficial ownership is involun-
77. See Prager v. Sylvestri, 449 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See note 25 supra.
78. Courts have missed this point in the past, particularly in the context of employee stock
options. For example, in Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954), the court found the
purchase to have occurred after the insider had already acquired beneficial ownership of the stock.
See note 21 supra.
79. See notes 21-28 supra. Some courts have been overly technical in their application of the
irrevocable commitment analysis. E.g., Portnoy v. Revlon, Inc., 650 F.2d 895, 902 (7th Cir. 1981).
That the decision is conditioned on certain events out of the control of the insider should not
divert a court's attention from the essential point that the decision is made and, from a section
16(b) standpoint, is irrevocable. Thus, inside information can no longer be useful. But see id at
901.
80. An application of the proposed analysis to tax qualified employee benefit plans can be
found in Tomlinson, supra note 9.
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tary. If the transfer is involuntary, no investment decision occurs.
Nevertheless, an insider's decision to support a merger is a decision to
attempt to terminate an investment in the company. This decision is
made voluntarily; insiders are not obligated to support the consumma-
tion of a merger.8' Support of the merger reflects both a decision to
terminate investment in the acquired company and a decision to invest
in the surviving company. On the other hand, an insider who opposes
a merger has not made an investment decision because his exchange of
shares is involuntary.
3. Time of investment decision. A merger cannot be consum-
mated until the shareholders of the acquired company formally ap-
prove the merger. Until the time of the shareholders' vote, insiders are
free to change their minds about their decision to relinquish the ac-
quired company's securities in return for those of the surviving com-
pany. Once the insiders vote their shares, however, they are
irrevocably bound by their decision. The day of the vote is the last day
that inside information is useful; thereafter the insider cannot affect
events, and his stock must be exchanged. Therefore, the day of the
shareholders' vote is the day the investment decision occurs although it
may precede the actual exchange of stock by several days or weeks.
Accordingly, it is also the day of the section 16(b) purchase and sale.
Finding that the investment decision occurs when shareholders
vote on the merger will seldom cause an insider in favor of a merger to
vote against the transaction. Under section 16(b), only insiders who
purchased stock within six months of the shareholders' vote can be lia-
ble for profits in a merger. Although merger negotiations do not neces-
sarily take six months, mergers are not quick transactions, and few
insiders unaware of merger possibilities are likely to purchase stock
shortly before merger negotiations begin.
4. An example. The proposed analysis can be illustrated by ap-
plying it to Gold v. Sloan.8 2 In Gold the defendants, Scurlock, Rumbel,
Sloane, and Sloan, were insiders of Atlantic Research Corporation. At-
lantic was acquired by the Susquehanna Corporation pursuant to a
merger agreement negotiated by Sloan and approved by the Atlantic
shareholders. Scurlock, Rumbel, and Sloane did not participate in the
negotiations. Apparently the defendants all voted in favor of the
merger. All the defendants became insiders of Susquehanna upon con-
81. An insider may be required to negotiate a merger based on an unsolicited merger propo-
sal if he deems it in the shareholders' best interests.
82. 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
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summation of the merger. All received Susquehanna stock in exchange
for their Atlantic stock and all sold some of the Susquehanna stock
within six months of the merger. Applying the pragmatic analysis, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held only Sloan liable because
only he had access to inside information regarding the merger.83
The court's analysis is far from illuminating. Invoking the prag-
matic approach, the court examined each defendant to determine his
access to inside information. If access existed, the court found the
transaction to be a section 16(b) purchase. This determination seems,
however, to have been made regardless of whether the inside informa-
tion resulted from the insider's relationship with the issuer or whether
the information even concerned the issuer. The court merely assessed
each defendant's knowledge of the impending merger. Only those with
knowledge were held liable.
The opinion fails to make clear the relationship between inside
information concerning Atlantic and speculation in Susquehanna
stock. The court noted that Sloan became familiar with Susquehanna's
business, apparently implying that he was therefore privy to inside in-
formation concerning Susquehanna. 84 Sloan did not, however, acquire
the information as a Susquehanna insider. Although he did owe a duty
to Atlantic's stockholders to disclose all such material information in
Atlantic's proxy statement,8 5 any failure to disclose could properly be
remedied under statutes other than section 16(b).8 6 Therefore, if access
to inside information concerning Susquehanna was necessary to char-
acterize the acquisition of the Susquehanna shares as a purchase, Sloan
should not have been found to have made a section 16(b) purchase.
The court's difficulty arose because none of the defendants were
insiders of Susquehanna when they acquired their Susquehanna stock.
Earlier cases had held that sales by insiders could be matched to
purchases made before they became insiders.8 7 Following these cases
the Gold court could have held the defendants liable despite their status
as Susquehanna insiders only at the time of sale. In Gold this applica-
tion of the statute would have been especially harsh. The court took
advantage of the flexibility of the pragmatic approach88 and sought a
way to avoid imposing liability on obviously innocent persons. The
83. 486 F.2d at 350-52.
84. Id at 352.
85. See SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.t. § 240.14a-9 (1980).
86. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976).
87. See, eag., Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
88. See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
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court achieved this result by absolving from liability those defendants
without access to inside information.
This approach confuses the analysis of purchases and sales8 9 and is
inconsistent with the statute itself.90 Actual access to inside informa-
tion is irrelevant to section 16(b). The statute presumes access to inside
information based on the insider's relationship to the issuer.91 The
court should have first determined whether the defendant was an in-
sider and then applied the statute. The court should have found that
none of the defendants were insiders of Susquehanna before the merger
and therefore the purchase of Susquehanna stock was not subject to
section 16(b). Although this result would have been inconsistent with
earlier decisions, the rationale underlying those cases has never been
very persuasive.92 Section 16(b) is designed to prevent short-swing
trading by persons with a particular relationship to the issuer;
purchases made when that relationship (officer, director, or ten-percent
shareholder) does not exist should not be subject to the statute.93
Even though the defendants were insiders when the subsequent
sales were made and inside information may have been used in the
determination to sell, the purchases should not be subject to section
16(b). The statute often does not apply when inside information might
be useful.94 It applies only to short-swing transactions involving both a
purchase and a sale made while a person is an insider; the statute ought
not apply to short-swing transactions involving only a purchase or only
a sale made while a person is an insider.95
Neither the existing dual analysis nor this article's proposed single
analysis addresses questions of insider status. These questions are irrel-
evant to whether a transaction is deemed a purchase or sale. Under the
proposed analysis all of the Gold v. Sloan96 defendants would be found
to have purchased and sold Susquehanna stock. Each acquired and
disposed of beneficial ownership for value. Each decided to invest in
89. See text accompanying notes 49-57 supra.
90. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
91. Section 16(b) was enacted "[flor the purpose of preventing unfair use of information
which may have been obtained by [an insider] by reason of his relationship to the issuer ......
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). See Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 521-22 (9th Cir.), cer.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3375 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1981) (No. 80-1903).
92. See, ag., Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
93. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident See. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 242-43 (1976) (person
not a 10% holder prior to a purchase is not subject to section 16(b) for a transaction that causes his
holdings to reach 10%).
94. See Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W.
3375 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1981) (No. 80-1903) and cases cited therein.
95. See Portnoy v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
96. 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
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Susquehanna stock by supporting the merger, and later to terminate his
beneficial ownership of the Susquehanna stock. Thus, all defendants
purchased Susquehanna stock on the date of the shareholders' vote and
sold it less than six months later. Assuming the defendants were insid-
ers of Susquehanna, all should have been liable under section 16(b)
because all sold and purchased within six months.
B. Stock Options
1. Transfer of benefcial ownership. Most courts have held that
the acquisition of a stock option is not a purchase of the underlying
stock until the option is exercised. 97 Under this article's proposed anal-
ysis, acquisition of the option is the acquisition of beneficial ownership
of the underlying stock. The holder of the option has the ability to gain
on the underlying stock. The exercise of the option does not change the
option holder's ability to profit on the stock because, whether the in-
sider holds the option or the stock, potential profit depends solely on
the price of the stock. By exercising the option, the holder accepts the
risk of losing the money he pays for the stock. The most important
element of beneficial ownership, however, is the ability to gain on the
stock, not the ability to lose; therefore, acquisition of the option is ac-
quisition of beneficial ownership of the underlying stock.
2. Investment decision. When an insider purchases an option 98
an investment decision has occurred. The insider has voluntarily ac-
quired the ability to gain on the underlying security. Employee stock
options present a more difficult question. Generally, it is within the
sole discretion of the board of directors to award such options. Because
directors eligible to receive options commonly are excluded from the
board's compensation or option committee, these insiders cannot cause
options to be awarded to themselves. Thus, option transactions are in-
voluntary, and inside information cannot benefit the insider. Accord-
ingly, there is no section 16(b) purchase because no investment decision
is made. The public shareholder also does not need the statute's pro-
tection in this instance. If significant nonpublic information exists that
97. See, eg., Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422, 424 (2d Cir. 1962); Stella v. Graham-Paige
Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299, 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956); Matas v. Siess, 467 F.
Supp. 217, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Levy v. Seaton, 358 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). But see
Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 356 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
98. The major types of options are "call" options (the right to purchase stock at a fixed price
for a specfied period) and "put" options (the right to sell stock at a fixed price for a specified
period). Many variations of these types of options exist; for example, employee stock options are a
type of call option. See generally Note, supra note 9.
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would make issuance of the options unfair, the board will not issue
them.
Just as the exercise of the option is not a transfer of beneficial own-
ership for section 16(b) purposes, it is also not an investment decision.
This conclusion is not intuitively obvious because by exercising the
option the insider places more cash at risk. Nevertheless, the decision
to exercise the option is a decision to continue an existing investment in
stock. Because he holds the option, the insider already has the ability
to gain on the stock; buying the stock does not change his ability to
profit. Section 16(b) does not apply to decisions to continue an invest-
ment, notwithstanding that inside information is obviously helpful in
making such a decision.
The decision to sell the option or the stock purchased by exercise
of the option is, however, a voluntary termination of the ability to gain
and, accordingly, an investment decision. A stock sale within six
months of the purchase of an option would therefore be a purchase and
sale for purposes of section 16(b).99
3. Time of investment decision. Generally the investment decision
occurs, if at all, when the option is acquired. If the option is held for
more than six months, profit realized on its sale is not within section
16(b). Similarly, if the option is exercised but the stock is not sold until
six months or more from the date of the grant of the option, profit is
characterized as long-term and not subject to section 16(b). 100
4. An example. A good illustration of the proposed analysis is its
application to Newmark v. RKO General, Inc. 0 1 RKO controlled
Frontier Airlines and in April 1967 negotiated a merger of Frontier
Airlines with Central Airlines. Under the proposed merger, holders of
Central Airlines' stock were to receive a share of Frontier stock for
every three and one-half shares of Central stock they held. Essentially
concurrent with the execution of the merger agreement, RKO acquired
an option to purchase forty-nine percent of the outstanding shares of
Central for a fixed price. The option was in the form of a binding
purchase contract, but, as the court noted, contained sufficient contin-
gencies to be an option. 10 2 Less than six months after acquiring the
option, RKO purchased the option stock. The merger also was effected
99. See, eg., Portnoy v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Portnoy v.
Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,889 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
100. See Rosen v. Drisler, 421 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
101. 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971).
102. 425 F.2d at 352.
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within six months of the acquisition of the option, and RKO exchanged
its Central shares for Frontier shares.
Using the pragmatic approach, the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit held that both the acquisition and the exercise of the option
to buy the Central stock were purchases of that stock.10 3 In addition,
the court held that the exchange of the shares pursuant to the merger
was a sale of the Central shares; hence RKO was liable to Central for
its profits.' °4
The court's conclusion that the Central shares were purchased
twice is illogical. The court reached this conclusion because of its evi-
dent desire to hold RKO liable. RKO could not be held liable unless it
had been an insider both at the time of purchase and at the time of
sale.105 RKO could not be considered an insider at the time of its ac-
quisition of the option to purchase Central shares.C6 To eliminate this
problem, the court held that the option contract was a transfer of bene-
ficial ownership of more than ten percent of the shares to RKO, and
that RKO, in exercising that option, was a purchaser of shares while an
insider.107 The court failed to explain how RKO could acquire benefi-
cial ownership of the same stock twice.
Furthermore, the court made no persuasive attempt to explain
how RKO's acquisition of the option conferred beneficial ownership.
All previous cases in the Second Circuit had held that options do not
confer beneficial ownership of the underlying stock to the option
holder. 108 The court stated only that the previous cases involved op-
tions that conferred no ability to acquire inside information, but that
RKO's did.10 9 Nowhere did the court explain how the ability to ac-
quire inside information affects the acquisition of beneficial ownership
of stock.1 0 The court stated that the ability to profit on the stock con-
stitutes beneficial ownership and then asserted that, notwithstanding
103. Id at 354, 356.
104. Id at 354.
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
106. Whether a purchase causing a person to reach the 10% plateau is subject to section 16(b)
was formerly a subject of intense debate. The Supreme Court concluded ultimately that such a
purchase is not subject to section 16(b). Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S.
232, 254 (1976).
107. 425 F.2d at 356.
108. See Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854
(1970).
109. 425 F.2d at 356.
110. The Supreme Court has indicated that lack of access to inside information may imply
that a transaction is not a purchase or sale. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 596 (1973). The Supreme Court did not indicate that access to inside infor-
mation has any bearing on beneficial ownership.
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this test, an option not conferring on its holder the ability to acquire
inside information could not confer beneficial ownership of the under-
lying stock.111
The analysis presented in this article avoids the result that the
court reached in Newmark. Under the proposed analysis, the acquisi-
tion of the option was the acquisition of beneficial ownership of the
underlying stock because it was the acquisition of the ability to gain on
the stock. The acquisition was a section 16(b) purchase because it in-
volved an investment decision. The purchase occurred on the date that
RKO acquired the option. The exercise of the option was not a
purchase of the stock because RKO already owned the stock. The ex-
change of the stock in the merger was a sale for the reasons explained
above in the discussion of mergers."12 Because RKO was not an insider
when it purchased the stock, however, its purchase could not have been
matched to the sale and no liability would have been incurred.
V. CONCLUSION
The development of two doctrines-the objective and pragmatic
approaches-under which courts apply section 16(b) has made analysis
of insider stock transactions unnecessarily complex. It is difficult for an
insider to predict with any certainty whether his transaction will be
identified as an unlawful purchase and sale; such uncertainty tends to
defeat the prophylactic purpose of the statute. Moreover, the confusion
is unnecessary; for analysis of the two approaches reveals that they are
based on common principles. This article has articulated those princi-
ples and has proposed a unified approach for analysis of all insider
stock transactions. Under this approach, all transactions may be iden-
tified as lawful or unlawful by application of the following three-ques-
tion analysis:
1. Was there a transfer of beneficial ownership for value?
2. Did the insider make an investment decision?
3. When did the insider make that decision?
Adoption of the unified approach to section 16(b) analysis would assist
the courts in effectively penalizing and deterring abuse of inside infor-
mation, because the approach focuses most clearly on the conduct that
the statute was intended to prevent.
111. 425 F.2d at 353, 356.
112. See text accompanying notes 80-96 supra.
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